ARTICLES
TWO PROBLEMS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
POLITICAL POLARITY ON THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT AND JUDICIAL
DETERRENCE OF AGENCY RULEMAKING
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.*

In a refreshingly candid article, Chief Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit noted in 1986: "The flow of membership in the D.C. Circuit... is
more like what one would expect in Congress with elections every few
years, or in the Executive, shifting its key policymakers with each administration."' Eleven of the twelve D.C. Circuit judges were appointed by
President Reagan or President Carter within the last nine years. Most
served previously in policymaking positions in either the legislative or
executive branches of government. Based on their record of decisionmaking with respect to judicial review of agency actions, the new members of the D.C. Circuit seem to be experiencing a difficult, and as yet
incomplete, transition from their prior active role in the partisan political
process.
Two problems have emerged in the D.C. Circuit's review of agency
decisions. First, the democratic and republican judges on the D.C. Circuit see agency policy decisions through dramatically different prisms.
Deeply ingrained differences in political perspective become particularly
apparent when the D.C. Circuit reviews agency policy decisions with significant ideological implications: the fate of a major agency policy decision reviewed by the D.C. Circuit will vary with the composition of the
2
panel that reviews the agency action.
Second, policymaking through agency rulemaking has declined significantly at some agencies during the past decade. 3 While other factors
* Visiting Professor, Columbia University School of Law; George W. Hutchison Professor of
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1. Wald, Rebel Angel in Flight, DISTRICT LAW., July/August 1986, at 30, 32.
2. "In our court right now, the result in close or controversial cases can turn on the composition of the panel." Id. at 32.
3. T. MCGARITY & S. SHAPIRO, REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE ON OSHA

RULEMAKING (1987); S. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS (1983); Mashaw & Harfst,

Vol. 1988:300]

AGENCY RULEMAKING

have contributed to this trend,4 the approach taken by appellate courts
when they review agency rules dominates the list of explanatory factors 5
The present D.C. Circuit is less deferential to the political branches of
government than its predecessors. It affirms agency actions far less frequently than did its predecessors. In reversing agency policies adopted
through the rulemaking process, the D.C. Circuit frequently substitutes
its own interpretations for agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory
provisions 6 and imposes rigorous requirements that agencies support
each element of a policy decision with detailed discussion of factual predicates and comprehensive reasoning from factual premises to policy conclusions. 7 In contrast, courts are less demanding when they review
agency policymaking undertaken through ad hoc adjudication of specific
cases. 8 As a result, some agencies are abandoning systematic approaches
to policymaking in favor of ad hoc policymaking.
These two phenomena are closely related in their functional effects
on agencies. When an agency begins the process of policymaking
through rulemaking, or considers initiation of that process in an important context, it knows that it must be prepared to satisfy the rigorous
requirements of some court of appeals at the end of the process. If the
agency does not discuss in detail each of the hundreds of issues raised by
participants in the rulemaking and each of the many studies submitted in
the proceeding, it risks judicial reversal and remand of its policy. Thus,
to avoid a holding that its policy is arbitrary and capricious, the agency
must prepare a "concise general" statement of basis of purpose that consists of hundreds of pages of detailed discussion of every conceivable issue raised by its policy initiative. 9 In this judicial environment, an
Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. REG. 257, 263-68
(1987); Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Consumer
Decade, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 35 (1982).
4. The Reagan Administration's minimalist attitude toward government intervention probably has contributed to the reduced level of rulemaking. Congressional requirements that some agencies permit cross-examination in rulemaking proceedings undoubtedly has contributed to the trend
in those agencies. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2058(d)(2) (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 1911.15(3) (1987); see McGarity,
OSHA's Generic Carcinogen Policy: Rulemaking Under Scientific and Legal Uncertainty, in LAw
AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION (J. Nyhard & M. Carrow eds. 1983); Schwartz, supra note 3.
5. Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 3, at 276-99.
6. E.g., Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Jersey Central
Power & Light v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Middle South Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 747
F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cerL dismissed, 473 U.S. 930 (1985).
7. E.g., Electricity Consumers Resource Council v. FERC, 747 F.2d 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
International Ladies Garment Workers' Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984); Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972).
8. See Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 3, at 299-302.
9. The Administrative Procedure Act requires only that an agency accompany rules with "a
concise general statement of their basis and purpose." 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1982). Courts have re-
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agency realistically must conclude that making an important policy decision through the rulemaking process will require it to commit a significant proportion of its scarce resources to that process for as much as a
decade. 10
An agency must also be aware that a reviewing court may not allow
it to implement its policy even after a lengthy and costly rulemaking process. In some circumstances, the agency knows from the outset that its
rule will be reviewed by the D.C. Circuit.11 In most circumstances the
agency at least knows that there is a high probability of D.C. Circuit
review.1 2 The D.C. Circuit reverses or remands over sixty percent of all
agency actions it reviews. 13 The agency cannot know the composition of
the D.C. Circuit panel that will review the product of its rulemaking, but
it can predict that the likelihood of reversal will depend in part on
whether the panel includes a majority of democrats or a majority of
republicans. In cases with significant ideological implications-most major agency rulemakings-democratic D.C. Circuit judges are more likely
to reverse agency policies at the behest of individuals, and republican
D.C. Circuit judges are more likely to reverse agency policies challenged
by business interests. Thus, the agency must conclude that the risk of
reversal of a major policy decision is high and depends in part on a variable that can neither be predicted nor controlled by the agency whose
policy decision is subject to review-the composition of the panel that
reviews the policy.
The combined effect of the demanding attitude of circuit courts generally toward agency policymaking through rulemaking, and the increasing political polarity of the members of the D.C. Circuit on any issue
with significant ideological implications, is threefold. First, the time required to make policy through rulemaking has been stretched to nearly a
decade. Second, the cost to the agency of making policy through
rulemaking has increased significantly. Finally, assessing the likelihood
of success in making policy through rulemaking increasingly resembles
the process of predicting the results of a lottery. If these two problems
persist, more agencies will react either by declining to make policy decifused, however, to give meaning to the adjectives "concise" and "general." See Automotive Parts &
Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
10. See Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 3, at 284-89.
11. A few statutes confer exclusive jurisdiction on the D.C. Circuit. E.g., 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607(b)(1) (1982).
12. Over one quarter of all agency actions were appealed to the D.C. Circuit in 1986. ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS

101 (1986).

13.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES COURTS 155 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 ANNUAL REPORT].
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sions at all, or by disguising policy decisions as resolutions of specific,
narrow disputes.
14
In part I, I describe the dimensions of the two related problems.
15
In part II, I propose solutions to the problems. The solutions to the
two problems are the same, and each is supported by recent decisions of
the Supreme Court and of the D.C. Circuit. Those decisions hold that, in
a variety of contexts, judges should defer to policy decisions made by
politically accountable agencies. Thus, at the most basic level, judges can
solve the problems of political polarity on the D.C. Circuit and judicial
deterrence of agency rulemaking simply by applying precedents in a consistent manner.
I.

A.

THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM

Ideology in the D.C. Circuit.

The ideology of members of the D.C. Circuit has long been a major
factor in the court's review of agency actions. Professor (now Justice)
Scalia engaged in a biting attack on the D.C. Circuit in 1978. He indicted the D.C. Circuit for substituting its own view of proper policy for
the views of the politically accountable branches of government, thereby
ignoring Supreme Court precedent to the contrary. He cited numerous
examples of cases in which the D.C. Circuit continued to base its administrative law decisions on its own ideology notwithstanding consistent
16
pointed rebukes from the Supreme Court.
The New York University Law Review's careful study of the D.C.
Circuit's record in the Supreme Court during the period 1980-1983 documented a continuation-indeed an increase-in the D.C. Circuit's tendency to play a major role in the nation's policymaking process, and of
that circuit's problems in the Supreme Court.' 7 During that four year
period, the Supreme Court granted petitions for certiorari from the D.C.
Circuit nearly three times as often as from other circuits.' The Court
affirmed the D.C. Circuit only 10.4 percent of the time-one-fourth the
affirmance rate of other circuits.' 9
14. See infra notes 16-83 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 84-156 and accompanying text.
16. Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup.
Cr. REv. 345; see also Verkuil, Waitingfor Vermont Yankee II, 55 TUL. L. REv. 418 (1981).
17. Note, Disagreement in D.C: The Relationship Between the Supreme Court and the D.C
Circuit andIts Implicationsfor a NationalCourtof Appeals, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1048 (1984). But see
Edwards, Public MisperceptionsConcerning the "Politics"of Judging: DispellingSome Myths About
the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. CoLo. L. REv. 619 (1985).
18. Note, supra note 17, at 1063.
19. Ia at 1050.
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NYU evaluated several possible explanations for the D.C. Circuit's
record in the Supreme Court and rejected all but one-the Supreme
Court and the D.C. Circuit are ideologically incompatible. 20 The NYU
study found that the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court were in disagreement over three fundamental issues: (1) the D.C. Circuit sees net
social benefits in judicial supervision of government activity in a wider
range of circumstances than does the Supreme Court; (2) the Supreme
Court is more willing to defer to the politically accountable branches of
government than is the D.C. Circuit; and (3) the D.C. Circuit is more
protective of the rights of individuals against the government than is the
Supreme Court. 21 In short, the D.C. Circuit consistently expanded the
role of the judiciary in policymaking, while the Supreme Court attempted to force the D.C. Circuit to assume a less expansive role in government policymaking. The Supreme Court's efforts to date have not
been successful. Indeed, in a 1988 article Chief Judge Wald characterized the D.C Circuit's role as that of an "aggressive senior partner" in
22
the administrative process.
From 1983 through 1986, the political composition of the D.C. Circuit changed significantly as a result of President Reagan's appointment
of seven republican judges. 23 This change had the potential to decrease
the ideological differences between the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit by reducing the tendency of the D.C. Circuit to assume a dominant
role in government policymaking. After all, President Reagan and former Attorney General Meese regularly extol the virtues of judicial restraint and deference to the politically accountable branches of
government. Presumably, the Reagan administration's appointees would
share this philosophy. Moreover, there was evidence that the historic
tendency toward judicial activism on the D.C. Circuit and the ideological
incompatibility of the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court were rooted
in the democratic members of the Circuit. Indeed, during the period
1980-1983, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit in every case in
which it granted review of a D.C. Circuit opinion written by one of the
24
four judges appointed by President Carter.
This potential has not been realized. The D.C. Circuit has become
more conservative politically, but it has not become more deferential to
the politically accountable branches of government. The D.C. Circuit's
20. Id. at 1050, 1060-63.
21. Id. at 1051-59.
22. Wald, The Contributionof the D.C. Circuit to AdministrativeLaw, 40 ADMIN. L. REV.
(forthcoming, fall 1988).
23. One of the seven, Justice Scalia, subsequently was elevated to the Supreme Court.

24. Note, supra note 17, at 1066 n.95.

-
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rate of affirmance of agency actions has shrunk dramatically to less than
thirty percent, compared with an agency affirmance rate of seventy-four
percent for all other circuits2 5-scarcely a sign of increased deference to
the politically accountable institutions of government. I cannot identify
all of the many factors that undoubtedly have contributed to this phenomenon, but one is apparent. The new republican members of the court
are more sympathetic than their democratic colleagues when representatives of business interests claim that an agency has unlawfully harmed a
business interest. Two decisions reversing actions taken by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) illustrate the combination of
political conservatism and judicial activism that is sometimes shown by
the republican judges on the D.C. Circuit.
In Middle South Energy v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 26 the agency had interpreted the Federal Power Act (FPA) to empower it to suspend, pending investigation, an initial rate filing. The
agency based its interpretation on a 1978 Supreme Court decision affirming an identical interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Act
(ICA),27 after which the FPA was modeled. 28 The republican majority
of the D.C. Circuit panel reversed the agency, distinguishing on subtle
grounds the arguably controlling Supreme Court opinion.2 9 The dissenting judge (a democrat) chided the majority for failing even to discuss the
deference due an agency's interpretation of the provisions of its organic
act under the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.30
In Jersey CentralPower & Light Co. v. FederalEnergy Regulatory
Commission,31 the agency had allowed an electric utility to recover in its
rates all of its investment in a cancelled generating plant but had disallowed any return on that investment. The agency's action was based on
a unanimous 1938 Supreme Court decision, Denver Union Stock Yard
Co. v. United States.3 2 Denver Union announced a doctrine that the D.C.
Circuit had in turn characterized as "a bedrock principle of utility rate
regulation" only two years before its decision in Jersey Central 3 3 In25. 1987 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 155.
26. 747 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
27. Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631 (1978).
28. 747 F.2d at 767.
29. Id. at 768-69.
30. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Middle South Energy, 747 F.2d at 774 (R. Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
31. 810 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
32. 304 U.S. 470 (1938).
33. Kentucky Utils. Co. v. FERC, 760 F.2d 1321, 1324 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See generally
Hoecker, "Used and Useful" Autopsy of a Ratemaking Policy, 8 ENERGY L.J. 303 (1987) (discussing evolution and applications of the "used and useful" concept).
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deed, FERC's policy on cancelled plants was far more generous to electric utilities than the policies of the majority of states, 34 and the D.C.
Circuit had affirmed a less generous policy adopted by FERC in the con35
text of gas utilities only two years prior to the Jersey Central decision.
Yet, four republican members of the court (joined by one democrat) reversed the agency policy at issue in Jersey Central. Over a vigorous dissent by four democrats who urged deference to the politically
accountable branches of government, 36 the republican majority held that
a utility has a right to earn a return on an investment even if the investment never provides benefits to consumers if the utility can show that it
otherwise will experience financial difficulties.
The D.C. Circuit is divided between political liberals and political
conservatives, but the court's basic ideology remains one ofjudicial activism. Indeed, Judge Wald has noted that, notwithstanding their sharp
differences of opinion on many issues, the judges of the D.C. Circuit
agree on the importance of "hard look" review of the agency policymaking process. 37 Thus, the ideological incompatibility of the D.C. Circuit
and the Supreme Court, documented by Justice Scalia in 1978 and by
NYU in 1985, persists in 1988. Moreover, agencies have more reason
than ever to fear reversal of their policy decisions by the D.C. Circuit.
The court affirms agencies far less frequently than in the past, and it
reverses or remands agency actions at the behest of a wider range of parties than was its practice when the court was dominated by democrats.
The lottery characteristic of the D.C. Circuit will be difficult to eliminate. Most members of the court seem to have little regard for stare
decisis, and en banc proceedings do not provide a promising vehicle for
reconciling the stark differences in political perspective that now pervade
the court's decisionmaking. 38 The court can accommodate only about
six en banc proceedings per year.3 9 Moreover, the government often declines to seek rehearing en banc when a panel reverses an agency policy
4°
that displeased a significant constituency of the administration.
34. See Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment ofMistakes in Retrospect Cancelled PlantsandExcess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 497, 517-20 (1984) (citing examples of state regulatory commissions denying return on investment for cancelled plants).
35. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. FERC, 765 F.2d 1155, 1163-64 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986).
36. 810 F.2d at 1202 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
37. Wald, supra note 22.
38. "In a court with strong ideological differences, some panels display outwardly their anius
to past precedent in the circuit ....
Wald, supra note 1, at 34.
39. Id. at 33.
40. Id. at 32.
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The D.C. Circuit's 1987 en banc decision in Bartlett v. Bowen illus-

trates both the degree of political polarity on the court and the difficulty
of attempting to obtain intracircuit consistency through en banc proceedings.4 1 Bartlett involved three unrelated cases previously decided by
panels that included a majority of democrats. The facts and issues of the

three cases are not important for present purposes. In Bartlett, a sixjudge majority consisting of five democrats and one republican reversed
sua sponte orders previously granting rehearing en banc in the three
cases. Five republican judges wrote a scathing joint statement of dissent.
The democrats characterized the panel decisions written by democrats as

"routine" and "run-of-the mill," 42 while the dissenting republicans char-

acterized the issues as of "exceptional importance" and the decisions of
the democratic panels as "clearly wrong." 4 3 Each group accused the
other of attempting to engage in "sweeping and revolutionary" changes
in the law. 4
After reading the opinions of the court en banc in Bartlett, and a
representative sample of panel opinions in other cases with significant

political implications, an agency administrator is likely to conclude that
the fate of any major policy the agency attempts to implement is largely
dependent on the composition of the D.C. Circuit panel assigned to review the policy. That realization alone will make agencies reluctant to
make policy decisions. Alternatively, it might lead them to disguise their
policy decisions as ad hoc adjudications of specific disputes.
41. 824 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Center for Auto Safety v. Thomas, 847 F.2d 843,
844, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en bane) (5 democratic judges would hold that public interest groups have
standing; 5 republican judges would hold the opposite); Hammon v. Barry, 841 F.2d 426, 427 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (en bane) (7 republican judges vote to vacate order granting rehearing en banc; 5 democratic judges dissent, saying "it is hard to recall an instance where leading precedents of the Supreme
Court have been given shorter shrift by this court"); Wolfe v. Department of Health & Human
Servs., 839 F.2d 768, 769, 776, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en bane) (7 republican judges vote to reverse
panel decision; 5 democratic judges dissent); Durns v. Bureau of Prisons, 806 F.2d 1122 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (en bane) (6 republican judges vote against rehearing en banc; 5 democratic judges dissent);
Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en bane)
(four republican judges vote against rehearing en banc; four democratic judges and one republican
judge dissent). Political polarity is also evident in the decisions of panels. I identified 34 cases
reported in volumes 804 through 831 of the FederalReporter, Second Series in which members of
panels differed concerning the validity of agency actions. In 26 of those cases, 76%, the differences
were between democrats and republicans. In only five cases, two republicans disagreed. In only
three cases, two democrats disagreed. A computer analysis of all non-unanimous panel decisions
during 1987 demonstrates even more starkly the extreme degree of political polarity on the D.C.
Circuit. Of the eleven judges who participated in decisionmaking during that period, a group of
eight, consisting of four republicans and four democrats, divided on purely partisan lines in virtually
all cases. Karpay, Bork or No Bork, GOP Bloc a Force on D.C Circuit, Legal Times, Jan. 18, 1988,
at 10-12.
42. 824 F.2d at 1242.
43. Id. at 1247 (Bork, Starr, Buckley, Williams & D.H. Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
44. Id. at 1243, 1248.
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JudicialDeterrenceof Agency Rulemaking.

Judges and academics long ago reached rare consensus on the desirability of agency policymaking through the process of informal rulemaking. 45 Justices Harlan and Douglas attempted to convince a majority of
their colleagues to compel agencies to make policy decisions exclusively
through the rulemaking process.4 6 The Supreme Court wisely abandoned that effort in recognition that it is impossible for agencies to make
all policy decisions generically in advance, and that agencies are best
positioned to determine the circumstances in which the many advantages
of rulemaking must be sacrificed for the flexibility of ad hoc policymaking through adjudication. 47
Still, courts consistently recognize the advantages of rulemaking and
frequently strive to encourage agencies to make policy primarily through
the rulemaking process. Many of the landmark decisions in administrative law are explicable in part by reference to the nearly unanimous
judicial preference for policymaking through rulemaking. 48 Judges and
scholars have identified eight significant advantages inherent in the
rulemaking process as a means of making policy decisions. 49
Rulemaking yields higher-quality policy decisions than adjudication
because it invites broad participation in the policymaking process by all
affected entities and groups, and because it encourages the agency to focus on the broad effects of its policy rather than the often idiosyncratic
adjudicative facts of a specific dispute. Rulemaking enhances efficiency
in three ways. It avoids the needless cost and delay of finding legislative
facts through trial-type procedures; it eliminates the need to relitigate
policy issues in the context of disputes with no material differences in
adjudicative facts; and, it yields much clearer "rules" than can be extracted from a decision resolving a specific dispute. Rulemaking also
provides greater fairness in three ways. It provides affected parties with
clearer notice of what conduct is permissible and impermissible; it avoids
the widely disparate temporal impact of agency policy decisions made
45. See generally 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.38 (2d ed. 1978); J.
MASHAW & P. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 273-

316, 385-413 (2d ed. 1985); R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS § 6.4.1 (1985); Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-RuleMaking Dilemma Under the Administrative ProcedureAct, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking and Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921 (1965).
46. See, eg., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 777-78 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissent-

ing); id. at 781-82 (Harlan, J., dissenting); California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 379 U.S. 366, 37677 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
47. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974); see also SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 199-204 (1947).
48. See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 45, §§ 6.4.1a, 6.4.1c, 6.4.7.
49. See supra note 45 and sources cited therein.
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and implemented through ad hoc adjudication; and, it allows all potentially affected segments of the public to participate in the process of determining the rules that will govern their conduct and affect their lives.
Notwithstanding the near-universal recognition that rulemaking is a
superior vehicle for agency policymaking, the courts inadvertently have
created several powerful deterrents to the use of that vehicle over the last
twenty years. This problem is not unique to the D.C. Circuit; all circuits,
and even the Supreme Court, have contributed to the problem in some
measure. 5° Some agencies do not even attempt to make policy through
rulemaking any more. 5 1 When they do, the process of promulgating a
rule that is likely to be affirmed by a reviewing court now approaches a
52
decade in many cases.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires a court to affirm
an agency rule unless it is arbitrary and capricious. 53 A court determines
whether an agency rule satisfies that standard by evaluating the "concise
54
general" statement of basis and purpose that must accompany the rule.
Over the past twenty years, the appellate courts have applied the arbitrary and capricious test to agency rulemaking in a way that has replaced
the statutory adjectives "concise" and "general" with the judicial adjec' 55
tives "encyclopedic" and "detailed."
To avoid reversal and remand of a rule, an agency must consider
explicitly the consistency of its rule with each of the many inherently
56
inconsistent goals Congress typically requires the agency to pursue.
The agency also must consider explicitly the issues and arguments raised
57
in comments submitted by potentially affected members of the public.
In the case of a rulemaking to resolve a major policy issue, those comments typically encompass tens of thousands of pages, include numerous
studies commissioned by interested parties, and raise hundreds of issues.5 8 In order to avoid reversal and remand, the agency's discussion
50. See, eg., Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 40-44 (1983)
(reviewing court should take "hard look" at agency reasoning process); Industrial Union Dep't v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642-46 (1980) (OSHA must make threshold finding that
toxic substance poses significant risk before it can regulate substance).
51. Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 3, at 263-68, 309-12.
52. Id. at 284-89.
53. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).
55. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see also Breyer, Judicial
Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 393 (1986); Wald,supra note 22.
56. Pierce & Shapiro, Politicaland JudicialReview of Agency Action, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1175,
1186-88 (1981).
57. Id. at 1190-92.
58. See Breyer, supra note 55, at 393; see also Costle, Brave New Chemical: The FutureRegulatory History of Phlogiston, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 195, 199 (1981).
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must demonstrate that it has "given full consideration" to each issue5 9
and that it has balanced "objectively" each decisional factor. 6°
Professors Mashaw and Harfst's study of rulemaking by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) illustrates both
the extreme scope of the obligations imposed on agency rulemaking and
the effects of those obligations. 6 1 In 1966, Congress enacted a statute
that required NHTSA to promulgate rules that enhance automobile passenger safety. 62 In 1971, NHTSA promulgated its most important rule
by far under the statute, a rule requiring installation of passive restraints
on all new motor vehicles. In 1972, the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded that rule in Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation.63
The court based its reversal on its conclusion that the rule did not meet
the statutory requirement that it specify "objective performance criteria"
because NHTSA's criteria for test dummies were incomplete. 64
Reviewing courts often say that an agency is required to address
only "significant" or "important" issues in its statement of basis and purpose accompanying a rule.6 5 Chrysler illustrates, however, that any issue
can be considered so significant that failure to address it "adequately"
and "objectively" will yield judicial reversal and remand of a rule. The
"dummy criteria" issue on which the Chrysler court predicated its reversal was considered trivial to the NHTSA proceeding-until the court issued its decision. 66 Considered in the typical context of tens of
thousands of comments and studies in which well-financed parties hostile
to the agency's proposed policy raise hundreds of issues, the Chrysler
opinion, read together with analogous opinions of other circuits, 67 sends
agencies a clear message. In order to survive judicial review, an agency's
"concise general" statement of basis and purpose must deal comprehensively and in detail with each issue raised in comments, no matter how
trivial that issue appears to the agency.
59. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 612 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 941 (1966).
60. Mobil Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 610 F.2d 796, 801 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980).
61. Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 3.
62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982).
63. 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972).
64. Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 3, at 282-83.
65. See Breyer, supra note 55, at 393.
66. Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 3, at 283.
67. See, ag., PACCAR, Inc. v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S.
862 (1979); National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
H&H Tire Co. v. Department of Transp., 471 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1972); Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
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NHTSA understood and acted upon that message. The agency required seven years from the date of the remand in Chrysler to devise a
new passive restraint policy that would survive judicial review.6 8 Moreover, NHTSA has abandoned almost completely its efforts to establish
policy through rulemaking; it opts instead to use the ad hoc approach of
recalling vehicles for "defects," because courts are more tolerant of
agency attempts to make policy in the context of specific cases. 69 Other
agencies have had similar experiences, with the same result-systematic
policymaking through rulemaking is being replaced either by policy pa70
ralysis or by ad hoc policymaking through adjudication.
Courts also have diminished agency interest in systematic policymaking by imposing requirements that agencies "find" unfindable facts
and support those findings with unattainable evidence. The D.C. Circuit's opinion in InternationalLadies Garment Workers' Union v. Donovan 7 1 is one of many illustrations. The Department of Labor (DOL)
promulgated a rule that permitted employees subject to the minimum
wage law to perform some functions at home.72 The International Ladies
Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU) claimed in comments that DOL
would not be able to enforce the minimum wage law in the homework
context. 73 DOL responded by referring to two studies that reached a
contrary conclusion and by expressing its own opinion, as the agency
charged with responsibility to enforce the statute, that it could enforce
the minimum wage law in the homework context.74 The court reversed
the rule on the basis that DOL's finding of enforceability was not supported by substantial evidence. 75 Yet, it is difficult to conceive of any
more persuasive evidence the agency could amass with respect to a
purely predictive judgment like the enforceability of a new policy.
The members of the ILGWU panel, like many appellate judges,
seem not to realize that the bulk of agency policymaking consists of risk
management under conditions of uncertainty. Very few government policies can be supported by reference to clear, objective factual predicates,
because many of the critical facts are unknown and unknowable at the
time an agency must make a policy decision. Moreover, as Judge Breyer
has demonstrated, there is no such thing as not making a policy decision,
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 3, at 295.
Id. at 299-302.
Id. at 276-302; T. MCGARITY & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 3; S. MELNICK, supra note 3.
722 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 799.
Id. at 819-20.
Id. at 818-19, 825.
Id at 825.
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or even deferring a policy decision.7 6 When an agency declines to make a

decision in favor of one policy, or a court reverses an agency decision to
adopt a particular policy, the agency or the court necessarily is adopting

an alternative policy. Thus, most policy decisions must be based on
highly imperfect data.
The D.C. Circuit has interpreted a 1987 Supreme Court decision in
a manner that deals an additional powerful blow to agency rulemaking.
In its much-cited 1984 opinion in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,Inc., 77 the Supreme Court held that a reviewing

court must defer to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous provision
of a statute that the agency is required to implement. In Union of Con-

cerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,78 a majority of a
panel of the D.C. Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's 1987 decision
in Immigration & NaturalizationService v. Cardoza-Fonseca79 as limiting
the scope of the Chevron doctrine to agency adjudicatory proceedings.
Cardoza-Fonsecainvolved interpretation of the statutory term "well
founded fear of persecution." In applying the term to Cardoza-Fonseca,
INS interpreted it to require an alien to prove that she was "more likely

than not" to be persecuted if she were returned to her country of origin. 80
Six Justices voted to reverse the agency's decision to require Cardoza-

Fonseca to return to Nicaragua based on their conclusion that the
agency's interpretation of its statute was inconsistent with "the plain language" of the statute.8 1 The opinion for a five-Justice majority then proceeded in dicta to discuss the applicability of the Chevron test. The
majority stated that the deference to be accorded an agency's interpretation of its statute under Chevron is limited to cases in which the agency
to a statutory term "through a process of casegives "concrete meaning"
' '82

by-case adjudication.

76. Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Court's Role in the NuclearEnergy Controversy, 91 HARV.
L. REv. 1804 (1978).
77. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
78. 824 F.2d 108, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1987). For additional evidence of appellate court confusion
concerning the scope and meaning of Chevron, see NLRB v. FLRA, 834 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
79. 107 S.Ct. 1207 (1987).
80. Id. at 1210.
81. Id. at 1213 n.12, 1223, 1224.
82. Id. at 1221. The Court addressed the question of the scope and interpretation of Chevron
again in NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 108 S. Ct. 413 (1987). The opinion
for the entire Court affirms an agency interpretation of a statutory provision, citing both Chevron
andCardoza-Fonseca. In a brief concurring opinion, four Justices "write separately only to note that
[the Court's] decision illustrates the continuing and unchanged vitality of the test for judicial review
of agency determinations of law set forth in Chevron." Id. at 426 (Rehnquist, C.J. & White,
O'Connor & Scalia, JJ., concurring). The concurring opinion continues by characterizing the D.C.
Circuit opinion in Union of ConcernedScientists as "mistaken." Id.
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It seems unlikely that the majority in Cardoza-Fonsecaintended to
limit Chevron deference to agency statutory interpretations adopted in
the context of adjudication. To the contrary, given the context in which
the statement was made, the majority's reference to Chevron probably
was intended to rebuke the agency for unnecessarily adopting a broad,
abstract (and erroneous) interpretation of a statutory provision in the
context of adjudicating a specific dispute. The passage discussing Chevron was totally superfluous dicta, since the majority held the agency's
interpretation inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statutory language. Moreover, it seems bizarre to say that Cardoza-Fonseca limits
Chevron to cases in which agencies apply statutory language to specific
facts, since Chevron was not such a case and Cardoza-Fonsecawas. Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit cited Cardoza-Fonsecafor this proposition in
83
Union of Concerned Scientists.
If Cardoza-Fonseca actually stands for the proposition that an
agency's interpretation of an ambiguous provision in its statute is entitled
to deference when the agency applies the provision to specific facts but
not when the agency interprets the same provision in a rulemaking, the
courts have added a powerful new deterrent to agency policymaking
through rulemaking. Appellate courts already had created significant
impediments to agency rulemaking by subjecting the agency factfinding
and reasoning process to much more rigorous review in the context of
rulemaking than in the context of ad hoe adjudication. If the agency is
now entitled to deference in statutory interpretation only when it makes
policy through adjudication and not when it makes policy through
rulemaking, as the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the Cardoza-Fonseca
dicta suggests,-it is hard to imagine why any agency administrator would
choose rulemaking over adjudication as a vehicle for making policy.
When the lottery effect of potential judicial review of agency policy decisions by the activist and politically polarized D.C. Circuit is combined
with the extraordinarily high cost and strategic disadvantages of
rulemaking created by decisions like Chrysler, ILGWU and Union of
ConcernedScientists, rulemaking as a vehicle for making policy decisions
may soon be relegated to a chapter in a legal history book.
Food & Commercial Workers is likely to increase the existing confusion and disagreeent in the
lower courts concerning the scope and meaning of Chevron. Judges who favor the Chevron approach
will interpret the concurring opinion as explicit Supreme Court disapproval of Union of Concerned
Scientists, since there is nothing in the opinion of the entire Court inconsistent with the explicit
statement in the concurring opinion. Judges who want to narrow the scope of Chevron will interpret
Food & Commercial Workers as an indication that only four Justices interpret Chevron broadly,
since the only clear statement to that effect is in the concurring opinion. The Court obviously must
revisit this issue in the near future.
83. Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM

There is a rich and growing literature that supports the proposition
that agencies enjoy significant comparative advantages over other institutions of government as sources of policy decisions. Jerry Mashaw concludes that "administrators should make political decisions" principally
on grounds of constitutional legitimacy and political accountability.8 4
Conferring policymaking discretion on agencies allows presidents and
administrations to respond to voter preferences.85 This, in turn, permits
policymaking to take place in accordance with majoritarian principles,
avoiding the high transaction cost of enacting specific legislation in Congress, which confers "enormous advantage" on the proponents of the
status quo.8 6 This constitutional and political advantage is particularly
obvious when the comparison is between agencies and courts.8 7 As the
Supreme Court recognized in 1984, "federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those
88
who do."
Judge Breyer reaches the same conclusion as Mashaw through analysis of a different set of factors.8 9 He urges courts to defer to agency
policy decisions for four reasons attributable to other characteristics of
judicial and administrative bodies. No judge can understand the complicated issues raised by an agency policy decision based on the only source
of data available to her on review-the record of the proceeding. 90 Empirical data on judicial review of agency policymaking demonstrates that
the effect of review is not beneficial; rather, the effect is random at best.9 1
Courts have little understanding of the difficulty of the process of agency
data gathering and policymaking.9 2 As a result, courts impose unrealistic demands on agencies and thereby create policy paralysis.9 3 Tom McGarity emphasizes the last two points in his careful study of agency
84. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why AdministratorsShould Make PoliticalDecisions, 1 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 82, 93-99 (1985).
85. Id. at 95-96.
86. Id. at 98. For an excellent discussion of the difficulty of enacting or amending a statute, see
generally G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). See also Pierce,
InstitutionalAspects of Tort Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 917 (1985).
87. See Pierce, The Role of Constitutionaland PoliticalTheory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX.
L. REV. 469, 504-13 (1985); see also Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in
Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.181 (1986). See generally Komesar, Taking Institutions
Seriously: Introduction to a Strategyfor ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1984).
88. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
89. Breyer, supra note 55, at 382-94.
90. Id. at 389-90.
91. Id. at 391.
92. Id. at 388-89.
93. Id. at 391-94.
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policymaking. 94 He describes a process in which agency decisionmakers
inevitably are "awash in a sea of uncertainties." 9 5
Peter Strauss arrives at the same destination as Mashaw, Breyer and
McGarity through yet a third route. He focuses on the managerial implications of appellate-court review of agency decisions. 96 He concludes
that judges should defer to agencies with respect to many issues, specifically including agency interpretations of indeterminate statutory language, for three related reasons. 97 First, agencies frequently have the
obligation to create and implement a coherent, integrated program to
govern a complicated and technically detailed area of regulation. 98
Courts have no such obligation and have little understanding of the integrated whole the agency must attempt to create. A single decision by a
reviewing court reversing one element of an agency's regulatory scheme
can force the agency to modify its entire integrated approach. Second,
circuit courts are likely to adopt inconsistent interpretations of indeterminate statutory language, thereby rendering it impossible for an agency
to implement any coherent national policy. 99 Third, the Supreme Court
has very limited practical ability to eliminate intercircuit conflicts. °° It
can visit any particular corner of the legal environment only about once
every five years.10 1 As a result, the Court can fulfill its obligation to obtain national uniformity in the administration of national statutes only by
instructing circuit courts to defer to agency interpretations of indeterminate congressional instructions in agency organic acts.
The D.C. Circuit's increasing political polarity and inability to resolve intracircuit conflicts through en banc proceedings 0 2 suggests that
Strauss understated the magnitude of the managerial problem presented
by permitting courts to second-guess agency interpretations of indeterminate statutory language. Even within the single circuit that dominates
judicial review of agency action, different panels give a single agency inconsistent instructions on how to do its job.10 3 Strauss's allusion to re94. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L. REv. 1243 (1987).
95. Id. at 1290.

96. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's
Limited Resourcesfor JudicialReview ofAgency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1987).
97. Id. at 1118-29.
98. Id. at 1126-29.
99. Id. at 1120-23.

100. Id. at 1106-07.
101. Id. at 1103.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 16-44.
103. For instance, two panels of the D.C. Circuit have reached totally inconsistent conclusions
with respect to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's power and duty to modify contracts
applicable to statutorily deregulated natural gas. Compare Office of Consumers' Counsel v. FERC,
826 F.2d 1136, 1139 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987) with Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981,
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viewing courts as "the bull in the legal china shop" seems apt.104
There is a single solution to the functionally related problems of judicial deterrence of rulemaking and political polarity on the D.C. Cir-

cuit-a solution that will honor the role of agencies as superior
policymaking institutions. Stated at the greatest level of generality, this
solution calls for greater judicial conservatism on the part of courts in
reviewing agency policy decisions. Judicial conservatism can be defined
in two ways-deference to majoritarian institutions of government and
adherence to judicial precedents. Although not always the case, in the
context of judicial review of agency policy decisions, these definitions
converge: a number of principles have been developed that call for judicial deference to agencies based on the value of agency function, and
strong precedents, both in the Supreme Court and in the D.C. Circuit,
support these principles. 10 5 Judges need only apply these principles and
1027 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Other examples of conflicts between republican and democratic D.C.
panel decisions abound. Compare AT&T v. FCC, 836 F.2d 1386, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (reversing
FCC contingent refund order) with New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 826 F.2d 1101, 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (affirming FCC contingent refund order); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810
F.2d 1168, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reversing agency's disallowance of hundreds of millions of dollars
in costs) with Office of Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 783 F.2d 206, 223, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(affirming agency decision and mandating that agency disallow hundreds of millions of dollars in
costs); enforcedper curiam, 826 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1987), motion to enforce mandate denied, 842
F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Jersey Cent, 810 F.2d at 1187-88 (refusing to acknowledge that FERC
had adopted and applied "used and useful" test) with Mid-Tex Elec. Coop. v. FERC, 773 F.2d 327,
357 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (reversing agency decision to create narrow exception to "used and useful"
test).
104. Strauss, supra note 96, at 1129.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131-35 (1985)
(reversing appellate decision that the Army Corps of Engineers' authority under the Clean Water
Act must be narrowly construed to avoid an improper taking under the fifth amendment); Chemical
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985) (holding the
EPA's understanding of the Clean Water Act sufficiently rational to preclude judicial second-guessing in light of considerable deference that must be shown to agencies charged with a statute's administration); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984) (absent explicit congressional direction, judicial review of an administering agency's statutory
construction is limited to a determination whether such construction is "permissible"); Baltimore
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97-98 (1983) (Court's role
in reviewing a decision of the NRC under the National Environmental Policy Act is limited to
ensuring that such decision was reached after adequate consideration and was neither arbitrary nor
capricious); FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981) (reversing appellate decision
for failing to show due deference to an FCC policy statement in light of Congress's explicit delegation); Federal Power Comm'n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 462-63 (1972) (Courts
should only reluctantly reverse Federal Power Commission determinations of its own jurisdiction
under the Federal Power Act if such conclusions are supported by weight of substantially supported
expert testimony); Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1342-43 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (in
establishing a standard of review for a decision by the NHTSA, court must remember that decisions
that require weighing of costs and benefits of alternative policies are peculiarly within expertise of an
agency); National Cable Television Ass'n v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 724 F.2d 176, 181 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (where Congress has given agency broad discretion within which to operate, court's re-

Vol. 1988:300]

AGENCY R ULEMAKING

consistently follow those precedents to reduce the problem of judicial
10 6
paralysis of government policymaking.
A. Agency Policy Decisions on Remand.
The D.C. Circuit is the source of a legal doctrine that has the potential to reduce the deterrent effect of the exceedingly demanding standards
courts apply in reviewing agency policy decisions made through
rulemaking. Traditionally, agencies and courts have drawn a direct analogy between appellate court reversal of an agency action and appellate
court reversal of a trial court action. In each case, the legal status reverts
back to the status quo ante unless and until the agency or trial court
conducts a new proceeding on remand. The analogy works reasonably
well in the context of classic agency adjudications. Consider, for instance, a judicial decision reversing a Social Security Administration
(SSA) order because the SSA based its decision to deny benefits to an
individual on inadequate findings or reasoning. The agency has the discretion on remand to attempt to correct the error on which reversal was
predicated by conducting a supplemental hearing to adduce additional
evidence and by changing the basis for its original action. As a result,
the proceeding reaches a relatively prompt conclusion.
The analogy breaks down, however, in the context of judicial reversal of an agency policy decision made through rulemaking. A judicial
determination that an agency erred in the process of adopting a new policy does not necessarily mean that the status quo ante-the agency's old
policy-is superior to the agency's new policy. Frequently, the basis for
reversal of the new policy is remote from the central purpose and basis of
the new policy. Yet, judicial review of the agency rulemaking process is
so demanding that the process of policymaking on remand from a court
decision reversing an agency rule usually requires many years.
view must be relaxed accordingly); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34-36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,

426 U.S. 941 (1976) (characterizing standard of review for cases involving agency decisions as
"highly deferential"); Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(amorphous nature of policy choices justifies more deferential standard of review).
106. Unfortunately, appellate courts are not alone in their inconsistent approach to review of
agency policy decisions. The Supreme Court occasionally sends signals that reviewing courts should
engage in rigorous review of agency policy decisions. See, eg., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-44 (1983). Judge Breyer criticizes State Farm in detail.
Breyer, supra note 55, at 384-94. The D.C. Circuit relies primarily on State Farm to support the
continued legitimacy of its "hard look" approach to agency policy decisions. See Wald, supra note
22. In my view, the Supreme Court decided State Farm correctly and accorded the agency's policy
decision appropriate deference. The unfortunate effect of State Farm in encouraging appellate
courts to assume an activist posture in reviewing agency policy decisions is attributable to a few
passages of dicta in which the Court referred to "hard look" review with apparent approval. See IL
PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 45, § 7.7, at 394-400.
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Mashaw and Harfst's account of the NHTSA's attempt to establish
a policy concerning installation of passive restraints to enhance motor
vehicle passenger safety, discussed above, illustrates the problem. 10 7 The
reviewing court in Chrysler obviously did not reach a conclusion that on
the merits the nation was better off with the status quo-no required
passive restraints-than with the agency's policy. Its basis for reversal
was peripheral to that critical issue. Yet, that was the effect of the court
action for many years. It took NHTSA seven years from the 1972 judicial reversal of its passive restraint rule to reissue the rule in a form ultimately affirmed by a court under the exacting standards established by
the Sixth Circuit in Chrysler.108
In 1987, the D.C. Circuit took the first step toward developing a
pragmatic approach to the issue of agency discretion to make policy on
an interim basis after a court has reversed and remanded a major rule. In
1983, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) promulgated
a rule that permitted electric utilities to include up to fifty percent of
their investment in construction work in progress (CWIP) in their rate
base if they could show that this rate treatment was necessary to alleviate
financial problems encountered in constructing a new plant. In Mid-Tex
Electric Cooperative v. FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission 109 (MidTex I) the court reversed and remanded the CWIP rule. The court held
that FERC had not adequately considered allegations that the rule might
have anticompetitive effects in some circumstances.
On remand, FERC took two actions. It issued a new notice of proposed rulemaking in which it solicited comments on the alleged anticompetitive effects of its rule and on ways in which it could avoid those
effects in a revised permanent rule. Simultaneously, it issued an interim
rule that repromulgated, with a few modifications, the rule that had been
reversed and remanded. The modifications consisted of assurances that
the agency would attempt to provide relief to any customer that suffered
anticompetitive effects as a result of application of the rule in an individual case.
The parties who obtained judicial reversal of the original rule challenged the repromulgated and slightly modified interim rule on two
grounds. They argued that it was substantively invalid because it was
inconsistent with the court's mandate reversing the original rule. They
also argued that the interim rule was procedurally invalid because it was
issued without notice and comment. In Mid-Tex Electric Cooperative v.
107. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
108. See Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 3, at 281-95 (describing Chrysler as a "managerial and

political disaster" that continues to "haunt" the NHTSA's regulatory activity).
109. 773 F.2d 327, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 110 (Mid-Tex I1) the court rejected both challenges and affirmed the interim rule.
On the substantive issue, the court noted that its prior opinion did
not address the issue of FERC's authority to repromulgate the remanded
rule on an interim basis."' Since the prior court opinion affirmed the
rationale stated as the basis for the rule, and since the agency took steps
"reasonably calculated to protect customers from the anticompetitive effects" of the rule on an interim basis, the court held the repromulgated
and slightly modified interim rule consistent with the letter and12spirit of
its prior decision reversing the permanent version of the rule.'
On the procedural issue, the court held that the agency had established "good cause" to promulgate the interim rule without notice and
comment for three reasons. First, the rule was an interim measure
adopted as a step in the continuing process of establishing a permanent
policy. 113 Second, even though the original rule was reversed, its fundamental approach was approved "in substantial measure."" 4 Third, the
court affirmed FERC's finding that continuing its pre-rulemaking policy
during the lengthy period required to formulate a permanent policy on
remand would be "contrary to the public interest."" 5
The D.C. Circuit's opinion in Mid-Tex II represents a promising
first step toward reducing the multi-year policy paralysis that has resulted from judicial reversal and remand of an agency rule. Under MidTex 11, an agency can repromulgate promptly a rule that was reversed
and remanded if (1) the major elements of the rule were affirmed; (2) the
repromulgated rule is adopted only as an interim measure in an ongoing
process to establish a permanent rule; and (3) the interim rule includes
features that represent a good faith effort to ameliorate on an interim
basis the problems created by the original rule that caused the court to
reverse that rule.
Mid-Tex 11 suggests that reviewing courts are becoming more sensitive to the policy paralysis that frequently results from court decisions
reversing agency rules on the basis that the agency failed to consider
adequately one of the hundreds of issues raised in a rulemaking proceeding. The Mid-Tex approach will reduce the scope of that problem in an
important context-when the basis for judicial reversal leaves intact the
rationale that lies at the core of the agency's policy and when the agency
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

822 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1130.
Id. at 1130-31.
Id. at 1132.
Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1133-34.
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is enthusiastic to implement its new policy. In other important contexts,
however, Mid-Tex has no effect on the problem. 116 The long-term solution to the problem of policy paralysis attributable to frequent judicial
reversal of agency rules lies in more realistic judicial attitudes toward
agency policymaking in areas of scientific complexity and uncertainty.
B. Duty to ConsiderAlternative Policies.
Few judges understand the process of agency policymaking sufficiently to enable them to empathize with the agencies whose decisions
they must review. Judges search for "findings" of fact, comprehensive
analysis of data and thorough consideration of multiple alternatives. The
nature of the tasks assigned agencies and the resources made available to
perform those tasks do not permit agencies to meet such exacting standards. Judge Breyer helps to put the agency's plight in perspective with
his graphic description of agency attempts to comply with the judicial
command to consider alternatives and to consider criticisms raised in
comments:
The reason agencies do not explore all arguments or consider all alternatives is one of practical limits of time and resources. Yet, to have to
explain and to prove all this to a reviewing court risks imposing much
of the very burden that not considering alternatives aims to escape. Of
course, the reviewing courts may respond that only important alternatives and arguments must be considered. But, what counts as "important"? District courts often find that parties, having barely mentioned
a legal point at the trial level, suddenly make it the heart of their case
on appeal, emphasizing its (sudden but) supreme importance. Appellate courts typically consider such arguments as long as they have been
at least mentioned in the district court. But district courts, unlike
agencies dealing with policy change, do not face, say, 10,000 comments
challenging different aspects of complex policies. And, when appellate
courts "answer" an argument they write a few words or paragraphs,
perhaps citing a case or two. A satisfactory answer in the agency context may mean factfinding, empirical research, detailed investigation.
Accordingly, one result of strict judicial review of agency policy 1deci17
sions is a strong conservative pressure in favor of the status quo.
The precedent that addresses Breyer's well-supported concerns most
directly and effectively is the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Centerfor Auto
Safety v. Peck 118 The court was called upon to review NHTSA's decision to reduce the minimum performance standard for bumpers from 5.0
116. Consider, for instance, the situation when an agency has a legal duty to establish a policy
through rulemaking, but it is not very enthusiastic about doing so. See, ag., Public Citizen Health

Research Group v. Brock, 823 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
117. Breyer, supra note 55, at 393.
118. 751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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to 2.5 miles per hour. The Center for Auto Safety challenged that decision on a wide variety of grounds, including inadequate consideration of
alternatives and inadequate data to support the decision. The court rejected each basis for challenge. It began by emphasizing that judicial
deference is particularly appropriate "when the agency is called upon to
weigh the costs and benefits of alternative policies, since '[s]uch cost-benefit analyses epitomize the types of decisions that are most appropriately
entrusted to the expertise of an agency.' "119 It declined to reverse the
agency for relying on one set of data while refusing to rely on conflicting
data, noting the Supreme Court's admonition that "'it is within the
agency's discretion to pass upon the generalizability of ... field studies.' " 120 It also declined to reverse the agency's decision to rely on its
judgment to resolve a major gap in available data rather than to conduct
expensive and time-consuming studies in an attempt to determine the
magnitude of "unknowable risks of injury."' 12 1 Finally, the court affirmed the agency's decision to evaluate only two of the infinite number
12 2 It
of theoretically available alternatives to the policy decision it made.
found the agency's consideration of alternatives adequate notwithstanding a patent error in part of the agency's analysis and reasoning: "Considering the record as a whole, we cannot say that this single error on an
alternative point-blatant though it may be-renders the entire rulemak' 23
ing arbitrary or capricious."'
Centerfor Auto Safety places an agency's duty to consider alternatives and to consider contrary arguments in realistic perspective. An
agency cannot possibly consider more than a very few alternatives. Its
analysis and reasoning always will contain flaws. The data available to it
to analyze alternatives invariably will leave major gaps and uncertainties.
Reviewing courts must tolerate a level of performance well short of comprehensive analysis of alternatives.
C. Agency Policy Decisions as "Findingsof Fact."
Tom McGarity's careful study of agency policymaking highlights
other critical features of the process that reviewing courts must understand. Because agencies regularly address "questions plagued by multiple uncertainties and a scarcity of information, ... [a] bright lawyer and
119. Id. at 1342 (quoting Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707
F.2d 1413, 1440 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
120. Id. at 1346 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 53 (1983)).
121. Id. at 1349.
122. Id. at 1365.
123. Id. at 1366.
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two or three technical aides can make almost any regulatory analysis
document appear to be irrational."' 24 Precedents abound that support
the need for judicial deference to agency policymaking in conditions of
25
uncertainty.
In FederalPower Commission v. FloridaPower & Light Co., 12 6 the
Supreme Court was presented with a challenge to an agency "finding"
that electricity flowed in a particular way. The company argued that the
agency had not supported the finding with substantial evidence because it
had accepted the theory of one expert and rejected inconsistent theories
presented by other experts without evidence that established which theory was "correct." The court of appeals reversed the agency on the basis
that "expert opinion about the nature of reality... is not fact."' 2 7 The
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the agency:
[W]e hold that well-reasoned expert testimony... may in and of itself
be "substantial evidence" when first-hand evidence on the question...
is unavailable. This proposition has been so long accepted... that we
do not consider it fairly in dispute.128
Yet, appellate courts reject this "long accepted" principle at least as often
as they accept it.
The D.C. Circuit's decision in Electricity ConsumersResource Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 129 (Elcon) illustrates the
tendency of appellate courts to ignore what the Supreme Court characterizes as a "long accepted" principle. FERC adopted marginal cost
principles as its basis for calculating wholesale electric rates. It relied on
expert testimony to support its finding that marginal cost pricing would
enhance economic efficiency.' 30 The court reversed the agency based in
part on a lack of substantial evidence to support this finding: "[M]ere
reliance on an economic theory cannot substitute for substantial record
evidence."' 3 1 Another panel of the D.C. Circuit has analogized this part
124. McGarity, supra note 94, at 1329.
125. See, eg., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Chemical
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985); Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983); FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450
U.S. 582 (1981); Federal Power Comm'n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972); Center
for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985); National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v.
Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 724 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976);
Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
126. 404 U.S. 453 (1972).
127. Id. at 464.
128. Id. at 464-66.
129. 747 F.2d 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
130. Id. at 1513.
131. Id. at 1514.
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of the Elcon holding to a requirement that an agency "conduct experiments in order to rely on the prediction that an unsupported stone will
fall."' 132 Economists characterize marginal cost pricing as "the central
133
policy prescription of microeconomics."'
The Supreme Court's decision in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 134 provides another good illustration of powerful precedent instructing courts to defer to agency policy
decisions made in conditions of uncertainty. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) issued a rule that licensing boards should assume
that permanent storage of nuclear waste will have no adverse effect on
the environment for purposes of deciding whether to grant a license to
any particular nuclear power plant. 135 The D.C. Circuit reversed the
NRC on the basis that itsfinding of no adverse environmental effect was
arbitrary and capricious. 136 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed
the D.C. Circuit and affirmed the NRC. The Court noted that the NRC
did not predicate its policy on a "finding" of no adverse environmental
effect. 137 The NRC explicitly acknowledged the existence of uncertainty
concerning the environmental effects of permanent storage of nuclear
waste. 138 Its directive to assume the absence of environmental effects of
permanent nuclear waste storage in plant licensing decisions was a policy
decision that the risks were too uncertain to use their existence as a basis
for denying a license to any particular power plant. 139 In affirming the
agency, the Court reemphasized the "long accepted" principle that
courts should defer to agency policy decisions made in conditions of
uncertainty:
Resolution of these fundamental policy questions lies ... with Congress and the agencies to which Congress has delegated authority ....
[A] reviewing court must remember that the Commission is
making predictions, within its special expertise, at the frontiers of science. When examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a court must generally be at its most
deferential. 14
By following LouisianaPower & Light and Baltimore Gas & Electric, and
applying the "long accepted" principle that courts must defer to reason132. Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
133.

1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 65 (1970).

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

462 U.S. 87 (1983).
Id. at 89-90.
See id at 95.
Id at 98-99.
Id.
Id at 101-03.
Id. at 97, 103.
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able agency policy decisions, appellate courts can reduce materially their
inadvertent role in creating policy paralysis. The D.C. Circuit also can
use adherence to this important principle as a way of reducing the political polarity that now infects that court's decisionmaking.
D. Agency Policy Decisions in the Form of Interpretationsof
Indeterminate CongressionalInstruction.
Appellate courts also must recognize that a high proportion of
agency interpretations of statutory language actually are policy decisions
due deference by the unelected judiciary. The Supreme Court recognized
this important principle in its oft-cited opinion in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 141
The issue in Chevron was the proper interpretation of the term
"source," as that term is used in the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air
Act. That Act requires any company that proposes to create a major
new source of air pollutants to go through an elaborate "new source review" process.' 4 2 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) originally interpreted "source" in a way that subjected any significant
addition to or modification of a plant, such as addition of a boiler, to the
new source review process, as long as the addition or modification produced emissions of pollutants above a relatively low threshold. In 1981,
the EPA changed its interpretation of "source" to refer to an entire
plant. Under this much broader definition, a company was required to
go through the new source review process only if the net effect of all
additions or changes proposed at a plant would be an increase in emissions above the specified threshold. Thus, a company could avoid the
new source review process by simultaneously increasing emissions
through an addition to a plant and reducing emissions by a corresponding amount through other modifications to the same plant. This change
in statutory interpretation was part of the EPA's movement to the "bubble concept," which is intended to give company management greater
control over specific decisions affecting air quality as long as the total
impact of a plant on air quality is not affected negatively by those
decisions.
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) appealed the
EPA's new interpretation of "source." The D.C. Circuit recognized that
the language and legislative history of the statute did not indicate how
"source" was to be interpreted.14 3 The court itself had adopted different
141. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
142. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685.
143. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723-24 (D.C. Cir.

1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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interpretations of the term in different contexts in its prior opinions. 144
The D.C. Circuit reversed the EPA's interpretation in the present context, however, because the EPA did not submit any studies to rebut the
NRDC's contention that the EPA's new interpretation of source would
14 5
produce less improvement in air quality than its old interpretation.
The court held that an agency cannot change its policy without documenting the effect of such a change. The court seemed untroubled by the
fact that the EPA's old interpretation, and thus the policy underlying
that interpretation, also was not supported by studies demonstrating the
effect of various statutory interpretations. Indeed, there was no evidence
available concerning the air quality impact of the two competing interpretations, and experts disagree concerning the likely effect of each.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the D.C. Circuit and affirmed the EPA's new interpretation of "source" based on the following
reasoning. The language of the statute and its legislative history indicated that Congress never addressed the issue of whether "source" was to
be interpreted to mean each part of a plant or an entire plant.14 6 The
EPA's new interpretation furthered one of the two principal goals of the
1977 amendment-permitting economic growth. 147 There was no evidence available concerning the impact of the new interpretation on Congress's other major goal-improving air quality. 148 Hence, the EPA's
choice of interpretations reflected a pure policy decision in an area in
which Congress delegated the EPA power to make such policy decisions.
The Court used strong language in rebuking the D.C. Circuit for the
expansive role it assumed in reviewing the EPA's policy decision. In the
Court's words, the D.C. Circuit "misconceived the nature of its role."' 49
"[F]ederal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect
policy choices made by those who do."' 5 0 The Court noted that judges
are neither experts in the field nor members of "either political branch of
government."' 5 1 By contrast, agencies are politically accountable experts to whom Congress has delegated a policymaking role.152 The
Court concluded with this unequivocal statement: "The responsibilities
for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
685 F.2d at 720, 727-281
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864 (1984).
Id. at 866.
Id.
Id at 845.
Id. at 866.
Id. at 865.
Id. at 865-66.
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between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones." 153
Some commentators have misunderstood the Court's message in
Chevron. They characterize it as a case in which the Court inexplicably
departed from the fundamental principle that judges should decide issues
of law.154 This characterization is based on a serious misunderstanding
1 55
of the legislative process.
Any time Congress enacts a statute that creates a new regulatory
regime, it creates the need for some governmental institution to resolve
hundreds of policy issues. Congress resolves some of those issues itself at
the time it enacts the statute. When a court reviews an agency's interpretation of statutory language, its responsibility is to determine what the
language means. If it finds evidence that Congress addressed the policy
issue that corresponds to the interpretive issue before it, the reviewing
court must confine the agency's choice of policies within the boundaries
established by legislative resolution of policy issues. The court does so by
reversing any agency interpretation inconsistent with congressional intent. Thus, for instance, a reviewing court should reverse the EPA's interpretation of "source" as a matter of law if it finds a statutory definition
of "source" inconsistent with the EPA's interpretation or an indication
in the language or legislative history of the statute that Congress considered and rejected the "bubble concept" that the EPA's interpretation of
"source" would implement. In the absence of such evidence, the court
fulfills its responsibility to declare what the law is by holding that the
term "source" is sufficiently ambiguous to support the EPA's
interpretation.
The court's task does not end at this point. It then must review the
agency's interpretation of the ambiguous statutory term to see whether it
is arbitrary and capricious. In performing this responsibility, however,
the court is reviewing an agency's policy decision. It should adhere to
the "long accepted" principle that reviewing courts should defer to
agency policy decisions as long as they are "reasonable." Since the effect
of the "bubble concept" on pursuit of the congressional goal of enhanced
air quality is uncertain, the court should affirm the EPA's decision to
adopt the "bubble concept" by holding "reasonable" the agency's interpretation of the ambiguous statutory term "source."
Consistent adherence to the principle announced in Chevron is a
particularly important component of the solution to the twin problems of
153. Id. at 866.
154. Sunstein, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L.
REv. 353, 366-71 (1987); Breyer, supra note 55, at 372-82.
155. See Pierce, Chevron andIts Aftermath: JudicialReview ofAgency Interpretationsof Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 301 (1988); Pierce, supra note 87, at 473-81, 504.

Vol. 1988:300]

AGENCY R ULEMAKING

judicial deterrence of rulemaking and political polarity on the D.C. Circuit. If judges view their responsibilities to include determining congressional intent with respect to issues Congress did not address, they will
find it impossible to perform their roles in a politically neutral manner.
Anyone who attempts to determine the meaning of indeterminate statutory language is bound to be greatly influnced by her personal political
perspective. If judges consistently defer to agency interpretations of indeterminate congressional instructions, and confine their role to enforcing those policy decisions Congress actually has made, they are far less
likely to succumb to the temptation to make disguised policy decisions
based on their own political perspective.
The D.C. Circuit's holding in Union of Concerned Scientists 156 represents the worst possible approach to the issue of judicial review of
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language. By holding that
courts should defer to an agency if, but only if, its interpretation is
adopted in the adjudicatory process, the D.C. Circuit simultaneously exacerbates both of the major problems that are the focus of this paper. If
the judges of the D.C. Circuit feel obliged to determine congressional
intent with respect to issues on which Congress has expressed no intent,
they will be forced to resolve major public policy issues every time they
review a major agency rulemaking. This will inevitably increase the already considerable political polarity on the D.C. Circuit. At the same
time, courts will have given agency administrators the message that the
only relatively safe method of administrative policymaking is through
making policy decisions disguised as ad hoe resolutions of specific
disputes.
CONCLUSION

The appellate courts have made the process of policymaking by
rulemaking extraordinarily expensive and time consuming by imposing
unrealistic requirements on agencies. The politically polarized and judicially activist D.C. Circuit, which dominates judicial review of agency
rulemaking, has added a high degree of risk to the process of policymaking through rulemaking. If these two problems persist, agencies will
have to follow the lead of the NHTSA-they will cease attempting to
make policy decisions in any systematic manner.
It seems apparent that the Supreme Court must play a significant
role in solving these functionally related problems. It should reemphasize in a few more cases the point it has so often made in the pastreviewing courts must adhere to the "long accepted" principle that
156. 824 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see supra text accompanying notes 75-83.
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unelected judges must defer to policy decisions made by politically accountable agencies. At bottom, however, the Supreme Court cannot
solve the problem; it can only point in the right direction. Chief Judge
Wald identified the only true solution in 1986:
I am afraid the only solution lies in genuine self-restraint on the part of

our judges ....

157

157. Wald, supra note 1, at 34.

